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ESSAY
FROM LANGDELL TO LAW AND ECONOMICS: TWO
CONCEPTIONS OF STARE DECISIS IN CONTRACT LAW
AND THEORY
Jody S. Kraus*

I

N his classic monograph, The Death of Contract, Grant Gilmore
argued that Christopher Columbus Langdell, Oliver Wendell
Holmes, and Samuel Williston trumped up the legal credentials for
their classical bargain theory of contract law. Gilmore’s analysis has
been subjected to extensive criticism, but its specific, sustained, and
fundamental charge that the bargain theory was based on a fraudulent misrepresentation of precedential authority has never been questioned. In this Essay, I argue that Gilmore’s case against the classical
theorists rests on the suppressed premise that the precedential authority of cases resides in the express judicial reasoning used to decide them. In contrast, I argue that the classical theorists implicitly
presuppose that the precedential authority of cases consists in the
best theory that explains their outcomes, even if that theory is inconsistent with the case’s express judicial reasoning. The classical view
of precedential authority completely defuses Gilmore’s charge of
fraud. In Gilmore’s view, merely demonstrating the inconsistency
between the proposition for which the classical theorists cited a case
and the express reasoning in that case suffices as proof of misrepresentation. But in the classical theorists’ view, the express reasoning in
a case is simply a theory of its precedential authority, which, like any
theory, can be wrong. Thus, the classical theorists simply reject Gilmore’s claim that a case cannot properly be cited for a proposition
inconsistent with its express reasoning. The real dispute, then, between Gilmore and the classical theorists is over the nature of precedential authority and not the content of contract law.
*

Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law, Professor of Philosophy, and Albert Clark Tate, Jr. Research Professor, University of Virginia School of Law. I thank
Barry Cushman, Robert E. Scott, Ted White and workshop participants at Case
Western Reserve University Law School, the University of Toronto Law School, and
the University of Virginia School of Law for helpful comments.
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Having reframed the classic death-of-contract debate, I then trace
these competing conceptions of precedential authority through the
major schools of contemporary contract theory. I argue that a contract theory’s embrace of one view instead of the other can be explained by the relative priority it accords to each of the two components in a conception of adjudicative legitimacy. A conception of
adjudicative legitimacy consists in a theory of what it means for a
decision to be based on law and a theory of what is required for law
to be justified. I explain why theories according priority to the former tend to subscribe to the precedents-as-outcomes view, while
theories according priority to the latter tend to favor the express reasoning view. The Essay concludes by arguing that the economic
analysis of contract law subscribes to the precedents-as-outcomes
view and therefore is the contemporary jurisprudential successor to
the late nineteenth-century classical theorists.
INTRODUCTION
In Harris v. Watson (1791), Lord Kenyon held that “[n]o action
will lie at the suit of a sailor on a promise of the captain to pay him
extra wages in consideration of his doing more than the ordinary
share of duty in navigating the ship.”1 His decision was based expressly on a “principle of policy”: “if sailors were . . . in times of
danger entitled to insist on an extra charge on such a promise as
this, they would in many cases suffer a ship to sink, unless the captain would pay any extravagant demand they might think proper to
make.”2 In Stilk v. Myrick (1809), Lord Ellenborough held that an
action did not lie on a captain’s promise to pay the remaining sailors the wages of two sailors who had deserted the ship in a foreign
port.3 One report of Stilk quotes Lord Ellenborough as stating “I
think Harris v. Watson was rightly decided; but I doubt whether the
ground of public policy, upon which Lord Kenyon is stated to have
proceeded, be the true principle on which the decision is to be supported. Here, I say, the agreement is void for want of considera-

1

(1791) Peake 102, 102, 170 Eng. Rep. 94, 94 (K.B.).
Id.
3
(1809) 2 Camp. 317, 170 Eng. Rep. 1168 (K.B.).
2
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tion.”4 In 1920, Samuel Williston, the author of the first modern
treatise on contracts and then-future reporter of the Restatement of
the Law of Contracts, agreed with Lord Ellenborough, citing both
Harris and Stilk for the proposition in Section 130 of his treatise
that a performance or promise to perform any obligation previously existing under a contract with the promisee is not valid consideration.5 In his classic 1974 monograph, The Death of Contract,
Grant Gilmore claimed “there is no conceivable way in which Harris v. Watson can be taken to have been decided on consideration
theory.”6 According to Gilmore, either Lord Ellenborough actually
decided Stilk on the public policy ground stated in Harris but his
reasoning was misreported, or he intentionally misinterpreted the
ruling in Harris because he was “an owner’s man all the way who
would use any theory, however far-fetched—even ‘want of consideration’—to strike down seamen’s wage claims.”7 As to why Williston cited Harris and Stilk as authority for Restatement Section 130,
Gilmore remained agnostic between the possibilities of “deliberate
deception” and “unconscious distortion.”8
An “owner’s man all the way,” “deliberate deception,” and “unconscious distortion”? Those were fightin’ words in 1974, and they
still are today. Gilmore was taking aim at Williston’s efforts to
marshal cases as precedential authority for the “bargain theory of
consideration,” which, together with the objective theory of intent,
comprised the doctrinal core of the nineteenth-century classical
conception of contract law. The doctrine of consideration holds
that promises are not legally enforceable unless supported by consideration. The bargain theory, famously championed by Oliver
Wendell Holmes,9 defines consideration as a performance or return
4

2 Camp. at 319, 170 Eng. Rep. at 1169.
1 Samuel Williston, The Law of Contracts § 130 (1931).
6
Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract 30 (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., Ohio State
Univ. Press 2d ed. 1995).
7
Id. at 29–30 & 127 n.57.
8
Id. at 30.
9
Holmes wrote that:
[I]t is the essence of a consideration, that, by the terms of the agreement, it is
given and accepted as the motive or inducement of the promise. Conversely, the
promise must be made and accepted as the conventional motive or inducement
for furnishing the consideration. The root of the whole matter is the relation of
reciprocal conventional inducement, each for the other, between consideration
and promise.
5
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promise that is “bargained for,” and states that a performance or
return promise is bargained for if it is “sought by the promisor in
exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in exchange
for that promise.”10 Gilmore claimed that Langdell single-handedly
“launch[ed] the idea that there was—or should be—such a thing as
a general theory of contract,” that Holmes created the “broad philosophical outline” of that theory, and that Williston fraudulently
legitimated the theory in the “meticulous, although not always accurate, scholarly detail” of case law.11 Stilk and Harris are Exhibits
A and B in Gilmore’s brief to expose Williston’s fraud.
Gilmore’s specific claim is that Holmes and Williston12 committed fraud by citing cases for doctrinal propositions that were unsupported by, and in some cases contradicted by, the express judicial reasoning of those cases. Once Gilmore purports to
demonstrate the gap or inconsistency between the classical theorists’ reading and the express reasoning of a case, he concludes that
the classical theorists engaged in either deliberate deception or unconscious distortion. The conclusion is a non sequitur. Gilmore’s
critique presupposes that an interpretation of a case is proper only
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law 230 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Belknap
Press of Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881).
10
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71 (1981). The Restatement of the Law of
Contracts incorporated the bargain theory of consideration in § 75 by defining consideration for a promise as “an act other than a promise, or . . . a return promise, bargained for and given in exchange for the promise.” Restatement of the Law of Contracts § 75 (1932).
11
Gilmore, supra note 6, at 15.
12
Gilmore never provides an example of a case that Langdell allegedly misinterpreted. Instead, he claims Langdell based his theory of contract on an unreasoned and
dogmatic explanation of a set of precedents that itself was unrepresentative of American contract law:
[Langdell’s contracts casebook], according to Langdell, was to contain—and
presumably did contain—all the important contract cases that had ever been
decided. “All the cases” turned out to be mostly English cases, arranged in historical sequence from the seventeenth century down to the date of publication;
the English cases were occasionally supplemented by comparable sequences of
cases from New York and Massachusetts—no other American jurisdictions being represented. The Summary [of the Law of Contracts, which Langdell added
as an appendix to the second edition of his casebook in 1880], . . . is devoted almost entirely to explaining which of the cases in the main part of the casebook
are “right” and which are “wrong.” The explanation, typically, is dogmatic,
rather than reasoned; Langdell knew right from wrong, no doubt by divine
revelation . . . .”
Gilmore, supra note 6, at 13.
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if it constitutes a plausible interpretation of the express judicial
reasoning in the case. In contrast, Holmes and Williston implicitly
presupposed the view that the doctrine a case sets as a precedent is
the one that best explains its outcome, regardless of whether that
doctrine is also a plausible interpretation of, or even consistent
with, the express reasoning offered by the deciding judge. On their
view, the express reasoning in a case is merely a theory, rather than
constitutive statement, of the doctrinal precedent set by that case.
The bare outcomes of cases, and not the express reasoning in cases,
provide the data that doctrinal theories must explain and justify.
On this view, the outcome is the only component of a case’s precedential authority that is exclusively within the control of the deciding judge. Even the outcome’s correct characterization for purposes of identifying a case’s precedential authority, beyond the
mere description of which party prevailed, is determined by the
doctrinal interpretation that best explains why the prevailing party
won.13 For convenience, I will refer to this view, somewhat mislead-

13

Karl Llewellyn defined the first question of case interpretation as an inquiry into
what the court actually decided in a given case: judgment reversed, and new trial
ordered. And the question of what express ratio decidendi it announced. These
are facts of observation. They are the starting point of all discussion. Until you
have them there is no use doing any arguing about anything.
K.N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush: On Our Law and Its Study 76 (1960). The second
question, however, is
what the rule of the case is, as derived from its comparison with a number of
other cases. This is not so simple, but the technical procedures for determining
it are clear. Skilled observers should rather regularly be able to agree on two
points: (i) the reasonably safe maximum rule that case can be used for; (ii) the
reasonably certain minimum rule the case must be admitted to contain.
Id.
Llewellyn referred to the view of precedential authority that identifies cases with
the minimum rule as the “orthodox” or “strict” view of precedent. According to the
orthodox view, “[t]he express ratio decidendi is prima facie the rule of the case, since
it is the ground upon which the court chose to rest its decision.” Id. at 66. In contrast,
Llewellyn referred to the view of precedential authority that identifies cases with their
maximum rule as the “loose” view:
the view that a court has decided, and decided authoritatively, any point or all
points on which it chose to rest a case, or on which it chose, after due argument,
to pass. . . . In its extreme form this results in thinking and arguing exclusively
from language that is found in past opinions, and in citing and working with that
language wholly without reference to the facts of the case which called the language forth.
Id. at 67–68.
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ingly, as the view that the precedential authority of cases resides in
their outcomes alone, or the precedents-as-outcomes view for
short.14 In contrast, if precedential authority resides in express judicial reasoning, the doctrine established by a case is identical to the
justification for the outcome of that case expressly articulated by
the judge who decided it, regardless of whether that justification
provides an adequate or consistent, let alone compelling, explanation for that outcome.15
Acknowledging the existence and plausibility of these competing
views of the nature of precedential authority defuses Gilmore’s incendiary charge that the classical theorists engaged in fraud or negligent misrepresentation. Instead, it exposes a much deeper disagreement, submerged below the surface of Gilmore’s complaint,
over the role of express judicial reasoning in the proper interpretation of precedent and over the role of stare decisis in transforming

Note that Llewellyn’s two conceptions both identify precedential authority with the
express language of cases. While the orthodox view limits the rule of a case to the express reasoning that determined its outcome (its ratio decidendi), the loose view includes as the rule of a case potentially all express reasoning in that case, regardless of
whether it was outcome determinative in that case (obiter dicta). In contrast, the
precedents-as-outcomes view I identify and associate with the classical theorists rejects the claim that the rule of a case is necessarily defined by its express reasoning,
including express reasoning that Llewellyn would characterize as its ratio decidendi.
For the classical theorists, the ratio decidendi consists in the best theory of the case’s
outcome, and the express reasoning of the case is just one theory among others.
14
It is misleading only because the doctrinal precedent set by a case, on this view,
consists not merely in its outcome, but rather in the theory that best explains and justifies that outcome, together with other outcomes that the theory treats as related. So
characterized, however, the precedents-as-outcomes view confronts a bootstrap problem: If case outcomes are the data that legal theories explain, then they must be identifiable pretheoretically. Yet even a minimal characterization case requires some theory for determining which facts are relevant. The precedents-as-outcomes view need
not claim, however, that outcomes can or must be characterized independently of
theoretical presuppositions. Rather, it characterizes case outcomes by making the
fewest theoretical presuppositions possible and identifies precedential authority with
the theory that best explains those outcomes. In contrast, the express reasoning view
holds that precedential authority resides entirely in the court’s express reasoning. It
therefore treats competing theories of case outcomes that are inconsistent with the
express reasoning of those cases as irrelevant to a case’s precedential authority.
15
For a detailed argument that economic contract theories embrace the precedentsas-outcomes view and deontic (that is, nonconsequentialist) contract theories endorse
the express reasoning view, see Jody S. Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law in The
Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law 687 (Jules Coleman &
Scott Shapiro eds., 2002).
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bad precedents into good law. In this Essay, I reexamine Gilmore’s
case against the formalists and argue that it is constructed almost
entirely on the suppressed premise that the precedential authority
of cases resides in their express judicial reasoning. Against all but
one of Gilmore’s charges of improper citation of legal authority,
the classical theorists can effectively defend their treatment of
precedent as proper by arguing that their interpretation of a case
provides the best explanation and justification of its outcome, regardless of its relationship to the express judicial reasoning in the
case. Against the remaining charge, the classical theorists’ view of
stare decisis explains why they would insist that a doctrine entailed
by their conception of contract law is a valid part of American contract law even though a well-known contrary line of cases left the
question concededly unsettled. This reexamination, then, demonstrates that Gilmore’s conclusions simply beg the question against
the classical theorists’ implicit view of the nature of precedential
authority and the role of stare decisis. Gilmore’s debate with the
classical theorists only appears to be over the substantive doctrinal
content of late nineteenth-century contract law. Although he evidently did not realize it, Gilmore’s real disagreement with the classical theorists is over the nature of precedential authority. And that
debate was never engaged because neither Gilmore nor the classical theorists explicitly articulated, let alone defended, their views of
precedential authority.
The question then naturally arises why the classical theorists
would implicitly subscribe to the precedents-as-outcomes view and
why Gilmore would reject it. I argue that the choice a theorist
makes between the two views of precedential authority is likely to
be influenced by the relative weight the theorist assigns to each of
the two prongs of a conception of adjudicative legitimacy: a theory
of what it means for a decision to be based on law and a theory of
what is required for law to be justified.16 Thus, the first prong of a
conception of adjudicative legitimacy provides an explanation that
connects the outcome of a case with the legal rules and principles
that are supposed to explain that outcome. For example, a legal
16

The claim here is not that a conception of adjudicative legitimacy logically entails
any particular view of precedential authority, but only that some pairings of particular
conceptions of adjudicative legitimacy with certain views of precedential authority
will be more theoretically congenial than others. See infra Part I and Section II.B.
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rule or principle might be connected to the outcome of a case because it uniquely determines that outcome given the facts of the
case. Alternatively, the legal rule or principle might be merely consistent with the outcome of a case even though it falls short of
uniquely determining it. The second prong of a conception of adjudicative legitimacy assumes that case outcomes can be satisfactorily
explained by the legal rules and principles of those cases but seeks
to explain why those rules and principles would justify those outcomes. For example, suppose the outcome of a case was uniquely
determined by the application of a legal rule instructing a judge to
flip a coin to determine which litigant should prevail. The second
prong of a conception of adjudicative legitimacy must explain why
the coin-toss rule is justified as a method of determining which
party should win. Ultimately, the second prong must explain why
the legal rules and principles of a case justify the state in exercising
coercion to enforce the court’s judgment. The second prong therefore must invoke a moral or political theory that explains why coercive state enforcement of a particular legal regime is justified. I
argue that the classical contract theorists were attracted to the view
of precedents-as-outcomes because their more general jurisprudential view, which Thomas Grey has termed “classical orthodoxy,”17
places almost exclusive priority on the first prong of adjudicative
legitimacy—explaining how the legal rules and principles of a case
lead to its outcome.
The formalism underlying the classical theory of contract law, of
course, ultimately succumbed to legal realism, and later to Critical
Legal Studies (“CLS”). Legal realists such as Gilmore, and CLS
theorists such as Duncan Kennedy and Roberto Unger, argued
that the legal reasoning of contract decisions played little or no role
in explaining, let alone justifying, those decisions. In the same period Gilmore wrote The Death of Contract, Charles Fried published the first contemporary deontic theory of contract law and
Charles Goetz, Robert Scott, and Richard Posner published explanatory economic theories of contract law. Both the deontic and
economic theories of contract were responses to the legacy of legal
realism and CLS. But Fried’s deontic theory exclusively challenged
their skepticism about the possibility of satisfying the second prong
17

Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1983).
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of a conception of adjudicative legitimacy for contract law—the
prong that purports to prove that the state is justified in exercising
coercion to enforce the rules and principles of contract law. Fried’s
concern was to demonstrate that the legal rules and principles of
contract law are grounded in a moral theory that justifies the exercise of state coercion. He gave virtually no thought to the question
of how those rules and principles are connected to the outcomes of
contract cases. Fried’s theory implicitly relies on the express reasoning view of precedential authority. I argue that this view is conducive to his view that contract law is justified by the moral promise principle. The economic analysts, however, primarily
challenged the realist and CLS skepticism over the possibility of
satisfying the first prong of a conception of adjudicative legitimacy—the prong that purports to explain how the legal reasoning
in contracts cases connects to their results. Like the classical contract theorists, the economic analysts implicitly believed that legal
reasoning can explain a case outcome only if it uniquely determines it. In this respect, the explanatory economic analysts inherited the jurisprudential mantle of the nineteenth-century classical
contract theorists.
The thesis of this Essay is that the competing conceptions of contract law advanced in both classical and contemporary theories of
contract can be properly understood, compared, and assessed only
by identifying the view of precedential authority to which each implicitly subscribes. This view will be influenced by the relative priority each theory accords to the two different prongs of a conception of adjudicative legitimacy: explaining how a contract case
outcome is based on the contract law that is supposed to explain it
and explaining why the state is justified in exercising coercion to
enforce contract law. Part I presents the tenets of “classical orthodoxy” that explain and motivate the formalists’ conception of contract law, their adherence to the precedents-as-outcomes view of
precedential authority, and their conception of stare decisis. It then
carefully examines Gilmore’s critique of the classical conception of
contract law, including the bargain theory of consideration and the
objective theory of intent, and argues that Gilmore’s critique begs
the question against the classical theorists’ view of precedents-asoutcomes. Part II then introduces contemporary deontic theories
of contract and argues that Charles Fried’s theory implicitly pre-
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supposes that the precedential authority of cases resides exclusively in their express judicial reasoning. It also explains why Fried
would be attracted to this view. Part III supports the claim that
economic analysts of contract law subscribe to the precedents-asoutcomes view by reviewing excerpts from the joint scholarship of
Robert Scott and Charles Goetz, and the early scholarship of Richard Posner. It also tries to explain why explanatory economic analysts would find this view congenial to their approach to contract
law.
I. CLASSICAL ORTHODOXY AND ITS AFFINITY TO THE PRECEDENTAS-OUTCOMES VIEW
When Christopher Columbus Langdell joined the Harvard law
faculty as Dean and began preparations for teaching contract law
in 1870, he set out to design a course that would treat the subject of
contract law as a science. For Langdell, that meant adhering to the
tenets of what Thomas Grey has termed “classical orthodoxy.”18
On loose analogy with geometry, classical orthodoxy postulated
that a field of law amenable to scientific analysis is governed by a
few general master principles from which more precise legal rules
could be deduced. Those rules, in turn, are applied to the specific
facts of a dispute to determine a result. But how did classical orthodoxy identify the principles of contract law in the first place?
Were the principles of contract law ultimately external to the contracts cases, and the cases themselves mere evidence of those principles, as antebellum jurisprudence had traditionally conceived
much of the common law?19 Or did those principles not only reside
in but originate from contract case law itself? According to Grey’s
lucid explication, classical orthodoxy induced the general principles
of contract law from the cases themselves, whose ultimate authority was derived from the principle of stare decisis. Once a line of
cases was sufficiently established, the principle induced from those
cases constituted a principle of law.
Langdell invented the law casebook—his most enduring tangible
legacy—as a pedagogical device for illustrating how the principles
18

Grey, supra note 17, at 2.
See, e.g., Llewellyn, supra note 13, at 43–44 (1960); Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis
and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1, 23–27 (2001).
19
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of contract law could be found in contracts cases. Had Langdell’s
examination of contracts case law led him to conclude that the set
of principles underlying the cases was logically incoherent or internally inconsistent—or worse, that no set of principles could be induced from the cases because they were hopelessly vague—he
would no doubt have abandoned his conception of contract law as
legal science. (Indeed, this was Langdell’s view of public law.)20 But
instead, Langdell’s analysis of the cases led him to conclude that
contract law was comprised of a logically consistent set of basic
principles from which the correct rules of contract law could be derived. Those principles provided the logical basis for his evaluation
of all contract decisions. Any case decided contrary to the rules
logically entailed by the general principles of contract law was
wrongly decided. All cases following the principle or rule in an erroneously decided case would also be dismissed as incorrect, unless
and until those decisions accumulated over time and became an established line of precedent. In that event, the erroneous rule would
be transformed into good law under the principle of stare decisis.
Langdell and his followers hoped, of course, that their clarification
of the internal logical structure and principles of contract law
would enable judges to decide cases accordingly, and that erroneous decisions would be quickly identified and rejected as bad
precedent, rather than repeatedly reaffirmed to the point where
they would acquire the force of law by virtue of brute persistence.
Indeed, Williston, a disciple of Langdell and fellow traveler in classical orthodoxy, took this position, which, in turn, was the raison
d’etre of the Restatement project he pioneered.21

20
See Grey, supra note 17, at 34 (“The classicists did not regard public law, including constitutional law, as amenable to scientific study at all. . . . Constitutional law was
unscientific, because hopelessly vague . . . .”).
21
See Samuel Williston, Change in the Law, 69 U.S. L. Rev. 237, 239 (1935) (“I believe also that the best path at the present time and in the future for judicial decisions
is in a fuller recognition of stare principiis as a qualification of stare decisis. This involves both a greater willingness to overrule outworn cases and outworn principles,
and greater frankness in so doing.”); Samuel Williston, Fashions in Law with Illustrations from the Law of Contracts, 21 Tex. L. Rev. 119, 133 (1942) (“Though Langdell’s
colleagues differed from him in many ways, they agreed in seeking fundamental legal
principles and testing them by observing their logical consequences in every conceivable aspect. If precedents conflicted with some of these consequences, and no good
reason could be found for the precedents, they were criticized. Stare principiis, rather
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Grey’s discussion explains the foundational role classical orthodoxy accords to stare decisis. But the principle of stare decisis is
only a part of the broader theory of precedential authority to which
classical orthodoxy subscribes. As noted in the Introduction, classical orthodoxy paired its claim that contract law consisted in general
principles induced from contracts precedents with the precedentsas-outcomes view of precedential authority. This view, of course,
differs from the view that the precedential authority of a case resides in express judicial reasoning, regardless of whether that reasoning provides an adequate or consistent, let alone compelling,
explanation for that outcome.
We can speculate that the adherents of classical orthodoxy were
attracted to the precedents-as-outcomes view because they aspired
to impose scientific rigor—or their late nineteenth-century conception of it—on contract law by demonstrating that it was coherent,
conceptually ordered, precise, complete, and determinate. Classical
orthodoxy would find the precedents-as-outcomes view congenial
because it would likely view the outcome of a case as the law’s
closest analogue to the empirical data of the hard sciences that inspires classical orthodoxy. There can be no doubt that the outcome
of a case has the force of law—the judicial order at the end of
every case is legally authoritative and binding on the legal officials
to whom it is directed. What a judge says about his decision could
be arguable and fallible, but under the principle of res judicata, his
ruling for one party over the other undeniably has the force of law
unless and until it is overturned on appeal.
In addition, by treating outcomes as the only legal facts established by a judicial decision, classical orthodoxy maximizes its ability to unify contract law under a small and coherent set of principles induced from prior decisions. At the same time, it minimizes
the extent to which the principle of stare decisis can undermine the
coherence of contract law over time. Similarly, cases whose express
reasoning would otherwise render them inapposite as illustrations
of the application of rules derived from those principles can serve
as ideal illustrations provided only that their outcomes are consistent with those rules. Simply put, the view that precedential au-

than stare decisis, controlled much of the thought in the school.”); see also William
Draper Lewis, Introduction in Restatement of the Law of Contracts, at viii–ix (1932).
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thority resides in case outcomes alone increases the flexibility of
the cases to accommodate a more theoretically elegant theory of
contract law. Treating case outcomes as legal wheat, and express
judicial reasoning as legal chaff, maximizes the prospects of maintaining the scientific respectability of the law. Or as Gilmore might
have put the point had he considered it, if cases are treated as the
legal “data” for a “science” of contract law, the view that the precedential authority of cases resides exclusively in their outcomes is
more conducive to data manipulation than the view that assigns
precedential authority to express judicial reasoning as well.
Classical orthodoxy’s aspiration to scientific rigor was not, however, an end in itself. Classical orthodoxy aspired to demonstrate
the scientific rigor of contract law in order to establish the legitimacy of contract decisions.22 Classical orthodoxy is motivated by
the same conception of adjudicative legitimacy described in the Introduction: that cases should be decided on the basis of justified
law. Demonstrating that contract cases were legitimately adjudicated, therefore, required an account of what it means to decide a
case on the basis of law and for the law to be justified. The formalists focused almost exclusively on developing a theory of the former. In their view, a case is decided on the basis of law only if its
outcome is uniquely determined by the applicable law. Classical orthodoxy itself is designed to insure that this requirement will be
satisfied. According to classical orthodoxy, the rules governing
contract cases are mutually consistent, well-ordered, and comprehensive. This means that every possible contract case will always be
governed uniquely by a contract rule that determines a unique result. Classical orthodoxy is therefore designed to insure that the
outcomes of contracts cases are uniquely determined by contract
rules, and thereby legitimate because decided on the basis of law.
The system of classical orthodoxy also acknowledged that determinacy of outcomes was merely a necessary condition for adjudicative legitimacy. It recognized that the legal rules that determined the outcomes must themselves be justified for the decision
to be legitimate. Classical orthodoxy accounted for the justification
of legal rules by allowing that considerations of “acceptability”
were to be taken into account during the process of inducing gen22

See, e.g., Grey, supra note 17, at 12–13.
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eral principles of contract law from prior contracts cases. But classical orthodoxy paid little more than lip service to this dimension of
adjudicative legitimacy. Its principal agenda was to demonstrate
the adjudicative legitimacy of contract law by explaining how contract law determined outcomes in contract cases. In sum, the contract law the formalists identified and subsequently enshrined initially in Williston’s contracts treatise, and later in the highly
influential Restatement of Contracts, was ultimately a product of
their view that contract adjudication must be legitimate, that legitimacy requires that case results be determined by the application
of rules derived from a small set of principles induced from prior
contracts cases, and that precedential authority is governed by stare
decisis and resided in case outcomes alone, rather than express judicial reasoning.
A. Gilmore’s Critique of the Bargain Theory of Consideration
That classical orthodoxy in fact subscribed to the view that precedential authority resides in case outcomes alone is evident from a
careful analysis of Gilmore’s critique of Williston’s use of precedential authority in his treatise on contracts. Let us return to the
discussion of Stilk v. Myrick and Harris v. Watson—the first two of
four exhibits Gilmore offers as evidence that the formalists’ bargain theory of consideration originated in fraud—and in particular,
to his argument that Section 130 of Williston’s contracts treatise
was a product of unconscious distortion or deliberate deception.
Williston cites Stilk and Harris as illustrations of the result compelled by the rule governing the enforceability of agreements to
modify prior agreements, which is itself logically entailed by the
consideration principle.23 Gilmore claimed that Langdell and
Holmes had insufficient case law authority from which to induce
the general principle of bargained-for consideration in the first instance. But Williston offered neither Stilk nor Harris as authority
for the bargain theory of consideration itself. Instead, he cited
them as authority for rules that are derivable from that principle.
Once we grant that the bargain theory of consideration is a principle of contract law (based on other precedents), the rule that modifications are unenforceable absent fresh consideration follows as a
23

Williston, supra note 5, at § 130.
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matter of logic. Stilk and Harris are illustrative authority for that
proposition by virtue of their outcomes alone. In both cases, an
agreement to modify a preexisting agreement is held unenforceable because it is unsupported by additional consideration. Even if
other explicit reasons might have been offered for those decisions
by the judges who decided them, or were otherwise available to
explain them, Williston (like Langdell) treated them as rightly decided because their result was logically compelled by a general
principle of contract law he took to be independently established.
While Williston’s citation of Stilk conceivably could be based on
its express judicial reasoning (as quoted in only one of two reports
of the case), his citation of Harris could not. The only noncynical
explanation for Williston’s citation of Harris is that he believed the
legal authority of a case resides ultimately in its outcome and is not
controlled by its express judicial reasoning. Moreover, this is precisely the view of precedential authority Lord Ellenborough explicitly embraced in Stilk when he said: “I think Harris v. Watson was
rightly decided; but I doubt whether the ground of public policy,
upon which Lord Kenyon is stated to have proceeded, be the true
principle on which the decision is to be supported.”24 For Lord Ellenborough, and later Williston, the “true principle” of law a case
sets as a precedent is the one that provides the most fundamental
ground for the decision, irrespective of the express reasoning in the
opinion. In fact, in his critique of Williston’s analysis of Dickinson
v. Dodds (1876),25 Gilmore himself appeared to realize that Williston’s analysis presupposes this view of precedential authority.26
Dickinson is the third exhibit Gilmore offered as evidence that
Williston systematically distorted precedent to fit his theory of contract law. In Dickinson, Dodds made an offer on a Wednesday to
sell land to Dickinson and at the same time promised that the offer
would be “left over” until Friday morning. But before Dickinson
attempted to accept the offer on Thursday evening, Dodds sold the
land to Allan.27 In Gilmore’s view, the statement that the offer
would be “left over” is ambiguous between an expiration date for a

24

(1809) 2 Camp. 317, 319, 170 Eng. Rep. 1168, 1169 (K.B.).
(1876) 2 Ch.D. 463.
26
See Gilmore, supra note 6, at 31–33.
27
Dickinson, 2 Ch.D. at 463–64.
25
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revocable offer and a promise not to revoke the offer.28 In addition,
citing the opinion of Lord Justice Mellish in Dickinson, Gilmore
claimed that the court held for Dodds solely on the ground that
Dickinson’s mind could not have met with Dodds’s mind after
Dodds sold the land to Allan.29 But Williston cited Dickinson as the
leading case authority for Section 55 of his treatise on contracts,
which states that “offers unless under seal or given for consideration may be revoked at any time prior to the creation of a contract
by acceptance.”30 Gilmore concluded that Williston distorted the
ruling in Dickinson:
[T]he Holmesians, describing themselves as objectivists, had
nothing but scorn for “subjective” or “meeting of the minds”
theory. The case was therefore restated as one involving, on
the facts, an offer clearly meant to be irrevocable and the result was explained on the ground that Dodds had received no
31
“consideration” for the assurance of irrevocability.
In fact, Gilmore’s analysis of Dickinson can be refuted even on its
own terms.32 But even if we were to concede Gilmore’s description

28

Gilmore, supra note 6, at 31.
Id. at 31–32.
30
Williston, supra note 5, at § 55.
31
Gilmore, supra note 6, at 32.
32
Here, Gilmore himself is playing fast and loose with Dickinson. Even a superficial
reading of Lord Justice James’s opinion, the other opinion in Dickinson, proves that
the court expressly decided the case, at least in part, on consideration theory:
“This offer to be left over until Friday . . . .” That shews it was only an offer.
There was no consideration given for the undertaking or promise, to whatever
extent it may be considered binding, to keep the property unsold until 9 o’clock
on Friday morning . . . [I]t is clear settled law, on one of the clearest principles
of law, that this promise, being a mere nudum pactum was not binding, and that
at any moment before a complete acceptance by Dickinson of the offer, Dodds
was as free as Dickinson himself.
2 Ch.D. at 472. Moreover, Lord Justice Mellish begins his opinion by explicitly agreeing with Lord Justice James on this question:
I am of the same opinion. . . . [T]his being only an offer, the law says—and it is a
perfectly clear rule of law—that, although it is said that the offer is to be left
open until Friday morning at 9 o’clock, that did not bind Dodds. He was not in
point of law bound to hold the offer over until 9 o’clock on Friday morning.
Id. at 473–74. It is therefore quite clear that both opinions in Dickinson interpret
Dodds’s statement that his offer would be “left over” until Friday morning as a promise not to retract his offer until Friday morning, and both Justices rule that this promise is unenforceable for lack of consideration.
29
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of the facts and express judicial reasoning in Dickinson, his critique
of Williston’s analysis of Dickinson, like his critique of Williston’s
analysis of Harris and Stilk, presupposes that the precedential authority of cases resides in their express reasoning rather than in
their outcomes alone. Yet even Gilmore appeared to realize that
Williston treated results, rather than judicial reasoning, as the only
authoritative component of cases when he wrote that “[t]he result
in Dickinson v. Dodds commended itself to the Holmesian theorists more than the facts or Mellish’s reasoning did.”33
For Williston, it would not have mattered if the Dickinson court
had not expressly based its opinion on the consideration principle.
Since the consideration principle made Dodds’s promise not to revoke his offer unenforceable, it was the proper ground for the decision even if consideration was not the express judicial ground for
deciding the case. Gilmore noted that Section 55 of Williston’s
treatise not only declares offers revocable absent consideration,
but further states that offers remain revocable even if the offer is
expressly held open for a definite period of time and the offeror
promises not to revoke it. Gilmore wrote:
Williston evidently treats the second and third propositions . . . as
logical deductions from the general principle. Williston, when he
wanted to, could read cases accurately; in this instance he did not
bother to pretend that the subordinate propositions were directly

But the ruling that the promise to hold the offer open was not enforceable was not
sufficient to decide the case. The Justices still had to consider whether a contract was
formed when Dickinson attempted to accept Dodds’s offer. Both opinions concluded
that acceptance did not occur because, on the version of the meeting of the minds
theory to which Lord Justices James and Mellish subscribed, Dickinson lacked the
power to accept Dodds’s offer once he knew that Dodds had sold the property to
Allan. Id. Thus, while Gilmore was right that Dickinson was decided in part on the
basis of the meeting of the minds theory, he was wrong that this is the sole basis of the
opinion. And he was certainly wrong that Williston distorted the facts by interpreting
the term “left over” to mean “held open” and that Williston ignored or distorted the
express reasoning in Dickinson when he cited it as authority for the proposition that a
promise to hold an offer open is unenforceable if not supported by consideration. But
as I argue in the text below, even if Gilmore had been right, Williston’s citation of
Dickinson would have constituted distortion only if its precedential authority is presumed to reside in its express judicial reasoning, rather than its outcome alone.
33
Gilmore, supra note 6, at 32.
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involved in Dickinson v. Dodds. It was enough that they “logi34
cally” followed from it.

Although Gilmore was mistaken that these propositions cannot
be directly supported by Dickinson,35 Gilmore was right to conclude
that it would be enough for Williston that they logically followed
from it. In fact, on Williston’s view, the subordinate propositions
follow from the general principle of consideration, as does the
main proposition of Section 55. Moreover, except for the unfortunate and relatively rare instance of an erroneous but established
line of cases, Williston did not need to read the opinions to identify
the legal rules they stood for. Those rules could be deduced from
the general principles of contract law alone.
Classical orthodoxy’s implicit view that the precedential authority of cases resides in their outcomes alone dissolves Gilmore’s critique of Williston’s analysis of Harris, Stilk, and Dickinson. Similarly, classical orthodoxy’s view that stare decisis has the power to
transform erroneous decisions into law undermines Gilmore’s critique of Williston’s analysis of Foakes v. Beer (1884),36 the final exhibit Gilmore offered as evidence of Williston’s fraudulent support
for the bargain theory of consideration.37 In Foakes, the court held
unenforceable an alleged agreement to discharge interest due on a
debt in return for full payment of the outstanding principal.38 In this
case, Gilmore conceded that the judge actually cited lack of consideration as the ground for the decision, but the judge did so
based on a dictum in a case decided in 1602 by Lord Coke, despite
Lord Coke’s having rejected that theory in subsequent cases and
the existence of substantial case law that found such releases enforceable, both in express reasoning and result.39 Williston cited the
case as authority for Section 120 of his treatise, which explains that
any agreement to discharge a debt in return for payment of a lesser
amount is unenforceable unless supported by separate consideration above and beyond the payment of part of the amount due.40
34

Id. at 33.
See supra note 32.
36
(1884) 9 App. Cas. 605 (H.L.) (appeal taken from England).
37
Gilmore, supra note 6, at 33–36.
38
9 App. Cas. 605.
39
Gilmore, supra note 6, at 35.
40
Williston, supra note 5, at § 120.
35
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Acknowledging the substantial case law to the contrary, Williston
wrote that Section 120 nonetheless “has at least the merit of consistency with the general rule of consideration governing the formation and discharge of contracts.”41
By characterizing Williston’s cautious statement as a “note of
somewhat muted triumph,” Gilmore implied that Williston was
conceding that Section 120 lacks sufficient precedential authority
to constitute an accurate statement of settled law.42 In Gilmore’s
view, Williston’s authority for Section 120 is so obviously weak that
it exposes the fraud that Williston otherwise manages to submerge
just below the surface of his analysis of contract law throughout his
entire treatise. But once Williston’s position is viewed in light of
classical orthodoxy’s view of stare decisis, Gilmore’s interpretation
of Williston’s analysis cannot be sustained. Williston’s claim is that
Section 120 is correct because it is entailed by the general principle
of (the bargain theory of) consideration. However, he acknowledged that if it gains sufficient acceptance, a line of cases reaching
results inconsistent with this rule might dislodge the rule under the
principle of stare decisis. Williston’s position is that a contrary line
of cases does exist, that it is based on erroneous reasoning because
it is logically contradicted by the principle of consideration, but
that it is an open question which line of cases will ultimately gain
acceptance and become part of contract law. Williston was merely
pointing out that the line of cases supporting Section 120 is the correct one, and for that reason should win out, even if under stare decisis, its merits cannot guarantee that it will.
B. Gilmore’s Critique of the Objective Theory of Intent
The bargain theory of contract is just one of two essential doctrines in the core of the classical theory of contract. The other doctrine, also championed by Holmes, is the objective theory of intent
which underwrites the doctrines of offer and acceptance governing
contract formation. In the classical conception, a contract is formed
when an offeror makes an offer to an offeree, which the offeree accepts in return. The question then arises whether a person makes
or accepts an offer only by subjectively intending to do so, or can
41
42

Id.
Gilmore, supra note 6, at 35–36.
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do so merely by engaging in conduct that communicates an offer or
acceptance, whether intentionally or not. Holmes answered that
the law of offer and acceptance was governed solely by the outward expressions of intent and not the subjective state of mind.
The first Restatement embeds this objective theory of intent in Section 20, which states:
A manifestation of mutual assent by the parties to an informal
contract is essential to its formation and the acts by which
such assent is manifested must be done with the intent to do
those acts; but . . . neither mental assent to the promises in the
contract nor real or apparent intent that the promises shall be
43
legally binding is essential.
The comment to Section 20 further provides that “if the manifestation is at variance with the mental intent . . . it is the expression
which is controlling. Not mutual assent but a manifestation indicating such assent is what the law requires.”44 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts follows suit.45
The sole exhibit in Gilmore’s brief to undermine the credentials
of the objective theory of intent is Holmes’s analysis of Raffles v.
Wichelhaus (1864).46 In that case, the plaintiff was a seller of cotton
who contracted with the defendant buyer for the sale of 125 bales
of cotton to be shipped from Bombay to Liverpool. Seller tendered delivery of the cotton when it arrived in Liverpool on a ship
named Peerless, which had departed from Bombay in December,
but the buyer refused to accept and pay for delivery of the cotton.
The buyer’s defense was that he had understood the term “Peerless” to refer to a ship of that name departing Bombay in October,
not December. The court ruled in favor of the buyer without stating the ground for its ruling. But the court interrupted defense
43

Restatement of the Law of Contracts § 20 (1932).
Id. § 20, cmt. a.
45
“[T]he formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation
of mutual assent to the exchange and a consideration.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts §17(1) (1981). “Manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange requires that
each party either make a promise or begin or render a performance.” Id. at § 18. “A
promise is a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way,
so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made.”
Id. at § 2(1).
46
(1864) 2 H. & C. 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Exch.).
44

KRAUS_BOOK

2008]

2/20/2008 8:06 PM

From Langdell to Law and Economics

177

counsel during oral argument to announce its decision from the
bench immediately after he had argued that because both parties
did not intend to refer to the same ship named Peerless, “there was
no consensus ad idem [agreement as to the same thing], and therefore no binding contract.”47 Because the court never inquired into
the reasonableness of either party’s understanding, Gilmore surmised that the court must have deemed it sufficient to void a contract that the parties did not share the same subjective understanding of the meaning of a material term in their agreement.48
But when Holmes analyzed Raffles, he argued that:
The law has nothing to do with the actual state of the parties’
minds. In contract, as elsewhere, it must go by externals, and
judge parties by their conduct. If there had been but one “Peerless,” and the defendant had said “Peerless” by mistake, meaning
“Peri,” he would have been bound. The true ground of the decision was not that each party meant a different thing from the
other, as is implied by the explanation which has been mentioned, but that each said a different thing. The plaintiff offered
49
one thing, the defendant expressed his assent to another.

Gilmore sarcastically derided Holmes’s analysis as “an extraordinary tour de force,” arguing that “[t]he magician who could ‘objectify’ Raffles v. Wichelhaus . . . could, the need arising, objectify
anything.”50 But on the view that the precedential authority of a
case resides in its outcome alone, Holmes’s objective intent theory
of the case is not fraudulent, even if, as Gilmore claimed, the court
decided the case on the ground that the parties lacked a shared
subjective intent. The validity of Holmes’s theory turns on its plausibility as an explanation and justification of the case outcome
alone, not on its consistency with the deciding court’s express reasoning. Holmes’s explanation of the case is that when the parties
said “Peerless,” they were in effect saying different things.
Holmes’s point, of course, is not that the parties uttered different
sounds, but that their utterances of the same sound counted as
“saying” the same word only if each party had sufficient reason to
47

2 H. & C. at 907, 159 Eng Rep. at 376.
Gilmore, supra note 6, at 43–44.
49
Holmes, supra note 9, at 242.
50
Gilmore, supra note 6, at 45.
48
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know the ship to which the other intended to refer by uttering the
name “Peerless.” To be sure, according to the objective theory of
intent, the mere lack of subjective agreement is not fatal to contract formation, as it is on the subjective theory. But even the objective theory of intent requires objective agreement for contract
formation. If each party reasonably but erroneously believes that
the other party is referring to the same thing, then even shared objective intent is lacking and formation does not occur. Although
the court in Raffles did not inquire into the reasonableness of the
buyer’s erroneous belief that the seller was using the term “Peerless” to refer to the ship departing Bombay in October, Holmes
can be read as fairly inferring that the court implicitly treated that
belief as reasonable. After all, the case reveals no reason for either
party to have known that there were two ships named Peerless departing Bombay and arriving in Liverpool. Holmes’s theory of Raffles is therefore plausible as an explanation and justification of its
outcome, even if inconsistent with the court’s implicit ground of
decision.51
Thus, according to Gilmore, the device Holmes used to perpetrate his fraudulent “reinterpretation” of Raffles was the idea that
a case has a “true ground of decision,” which may be different
51

For the same reason, Holmes’s objective intent account is just as plausible as Gilmore’s subjective intent account of the court’s implicit ground of decision. When the
court interrupted following defense counsel’s argument that there was no consensus
ad idem, it could be fairly read as treating either the lack of subjective intent or the
lack of objective intent as dispositive. Notably, in commenting on the first Restatement’s embrace of Holmes’s interpretation of Raffles, Arthur Corbin endorsed it as
correct:
[T]he actual decisions being rendered cannot be explained and their rules restated without making use of the objective theory. . . . With respect to the case
of the ship “Peerless” . . . it is believed that there was no contract, not because
of the absence of a meeting of two hypothetical “minds,” but because the objective expressions of the two parties were not in agreement and did not so identify
the subject matter of the contract as to make it enforceable. In the light of the
surrounding facts, the words used by the two parties might equally well be
taken to express any one of the following: (1) agreement to sell the cotton on
the October “Peerless”; (2) agreement to sell the cotton on the December
“Peerless”; (3) a promise to sell cotton on the October “Peerlees” and a return
promise to buy cotton on the December “Peerless”; (4) a promise to sell cotton
on the December “Peerless” and a return promise to buy cotton on the October
“Peerless.”
Arthur Corbin, The Restatement of the Common Law by the American Law Institute, 15 Iowa L. Rev. 19, 34–35 (1929).
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than, and even contradictory to, the express or implied ground of
the judges who decided the case.52 But here again, Gilmore failed
to grasp that the formalists regarded precedential authority as residing in case outcomes alone, not in the express, or even implied,
reasoning of the judges deciding cases. On this view, the real doctrine (or “true ground”) of cases is the “theory” of the doctrine
that best explains the case outcomes. Holmes was cheating only on
the view that the precedential authority of a case resides in the express or implied reasoning of the judge deciding it, a view that
Holmes (like Lord Ellenborough before him) quite explicitly rejected.
II. FROM FORMALIST TO DEONTIC THEORIES OF CONTRACT
I have so far focused on Gilmore’s criticisms of Williston’s use of
legal authority to support core doctrines in the classical conception
of contract law. But Gilmore also famously argued that even
though the bargain theory of contract law actually became law at
some point (in his view, largely as a result of the formalists’ considerable efforts to make it the law), it was nonetheless almost completely reabsorbed into tort law during the first half of the twentieth century. Indeed, Gilmore predicted that the first-year course in
contracts would soon be replaced by a course entitled “contorts.”
So Gilmore’s assault on contracts was double-edged: contracts as a
distinctive and unified body of law did not exist prior to the successful efforts of Langdell, Holmes, and Williston to manufacture it
out of whole cloth,53 and it was eroded by tort law after its crea52

Gilmore, supra note 6, at 45, 46.
“Until the late eighteenth century there was no such thing as a . . . law of contracts. Before then there were cases . . . about contracts. But cases are one thing and a
systematically organized, sharply differentiated body of law is quite another thing.”
Gilmore, supra note 6, at 9. “For [Justice Joseph] Story, then, there was no such thing
as a generalized law of—or theory of—contract. . . . Story, indeed, during his astonishingly productive career, wrote treatises on most . . . specialized bodies of law; it never
occurred to him to write a treatise on ‘Contracts.’” Id. at 12. Justice Story’s son, William Wetmore Story, wrote the Treatise on the Law of Contracts Not Under Seal
(1844), revised and expanded in the 1847 second edition. But this treatise did not attempt to present contracts as a unified field but instead treated it as consisting in independent branches corresponding to different types of transactions, each governed
by distinct doctrine (for example, contracts of factors, brokers, auctioneers, executors
and administrators). Id. at 116 n.16. Even Parsons on Contracts (1853), written by
Theophilus Parsons, the Dane Professor of Law at Harvard Law School from 1848
53
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tion.54 Taken as a whole, Gilmore’s thesis is that contract law never
was nor could be maintained as a conceptually unified and distinctive body of law. In fact, Gilmore’s thesis was shared by other
prominent twentieth-century contract scholars, such as Patrick
Atiyah and Lon Fuller, who argued that the origins and current
doctrine of contract law were grounded in the concern to protect
individuals’ reliance interest, rather than expectancy interest, as
classical theory maintained.55 It is not difficult to understand why
this would offend the jurisprudential sensibilities of adherents to
classical orthodoxy. If true, then contract law might be scientifically
disreputable and contract law adjudication might be illegitimate.
Whether so-called “contract” decisions were adjudicatively legitimate would depend on whether tort law, which really governed
them, is amenable to a scientifically respectable analysis that demonstrated its adjudicative legitimacy. But by Gilmore’s time, classical orthodoxy had long been discredited, both by developments in
scientific theory and the legal realist movement.56
Although adherents of classical orthodoxy were nowhere to be
found by the time Gilmore published his critique, his thesis resonated in two of the most heated debates of late twentieth-century
legal and political theory. The Critical Legal Studies movement
had begun to resuscitate, in new form, some of the claims of legal
realism.57 In particular, CLS shared legal realism’s claim that for-

until 1870, “also turns out to be, on examination, simply a treatment, seriatim, of the
several types of ‘commercial contracts’ identified by Justice Story and analyzed in his
own Commentaries and in his son’s two Treatises.” Id.
54
“[T]he theory of contract, as formulated by Holmes and Williston, seems to have
gone into its protracted period of breakdown almost from the moment of its birth.”
Gilmore, supra note 6, at 63. “During the past forty years we have seen the effective
dismantling of the formal system of classical contract theory. We have witnessed what
it does not seem too farfetched to describe as an explosion of liability.” Id. at 72.
55
See, e.g., P.S. Atiyah, Promises, Morals, and Law (1981); P.S. Atiyah, Essays on
Contract (1986); L.L. Fuller and William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 Yale L.J. 52 (1936).
56
As Gilmore pointed out, the realists ironically used Langdell’s Socratic case
method to prove that any formal construction of legal doctrine could be equally deconstructed by the same method. “By the 1930s, at least in the law schools, the Langdellian position had become untenable—and, in an unkind reversal, the case method
of teaching had been turned on its head and used to disprove everything its inventor
had held dear.” Gilmore, supra note 6, at 65.
57
For an excellent critical introduction to CLS, see Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (1987). For an overview of American Legal Realism, see Brian Le-
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mal doctrinal analysis was nothing more than conceptual window
dressing. But CLS coupled doctrinal skepticism with the claim that
the law’s pretense of formal and objective validity was used systematically to advance particular political interests at the expense
of other interests. CLS not only questioned law’s legitimacy indirectly by asserting its lack of conceptual integrity, but also directly
by claiming that it served as a tool to provide pretextually objective
justifications for social decisions in favor of particular social interests or points of view. Since liberalism was often advanced as the
political theory that provided an objective justification of the legal
system, the CLS movement was intended as an attack on the integrity of liberalism as well. In short, CLS asserted the adjudicative illegitimacy of all law, and the cornerstone of its critique was the
claim that law’s formal categories and doctrines were both artificially manufactured (to serve particular interests under the guise of
liberalism) and demonstrably indeterminate or contradictory.
At the same time that the CLS movement was emerging, a renaissance in both jurisprudence and political philosophy was well
under way. In jurisprudence, Ronald Dworkin had just argued that
even hard cases had right answers.58 In contrast to H.L.A. Hart’s
positivism, Dworkin’s rights theory held that the law always included principles of political morality sufficient to resolve any dispute not covered by positive legal rules.59 In political philosophy,
Rawls had just published A Theory of Justice, which was widely regarded as making a brilliant and ground-breaking argument for the
claim that political coercion could be justified on the basis of universally justified (liberal) principles of justice.60 Against this intellectual backdrop, Gilmore’s critique was naturally perceived as
ammunition for the CLS critique of law’s conceptual integrity and
legitimacy. In response, Charles Fried’s Contract as Promise

iter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 Tex. L. Rev.
267 (1997), and Brian Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal
Realism and Naturalism in Legal Philosophy (2007).
58
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 81–130 (1977).
59
For Hart’s classic statement of American legal positivism, see H.L.A. Hart, The
Concept of Law (1961). For Dworkin’s critique of Hart’s positivism, see Dworkin, supra note 58, at 14–45; see also Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Principle: In Defence
of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory 65–217 (2001).
60
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Belknap Press 1999) (1971).
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emerged as the first contemporary, comprehensive, deontic theory
of contract.
A. Charles Fried’s Contract as Promise
Charles Fried begins his book, Contract as Promise (1981), with
the proclamation that “[t]he promise principle . . . is the moral basis of contract law.”61 Fried’s theory of contract is motivated by the
attacks on the classical conception of contract leveled by Gilmore
and other contemporaries. Together, these attacks rejected the
idea that contract was a body of law capable of unification under
any single concept, principle, or theory that distinguished it as a
coherent and distinctive body of law. In particular, these critics denied that contract law could be explained or justified by the will
theory—the view that the obligations contract law enforced are
self-imposed. By rejecting the will theory, these critics denied that
contract law could be justified on the ground that it respected “the
dispositions individuals make of their rights, [and thereby] carries
to its natural conclusion the liberal premise that individuals have
rights.”62 The heart of Fried’s claim is that the will theory, properly
understood, can explain and justify contract law.
Like the formalists, Fried defends the claim that contract law has
an “essential unity” and “offers a distinct and compelling ground of
obligation.”63 And like the formalists, his ultimate motivation is to
vindicate the adjudicative legitimacy of contract law. But as we
have seen, for the formalists the primary strategy for proving the
adjudicative legitimacy of contract law was to demonstrate how
contract law could provide the basis for a decision in a case (for
them, how the law could determine the outcome in a case), rather
than proving that the law was itself justified. Their efforts to prove
the coherence of contract law were part of their effort to show how
contract law determined results in cases. If contract law could not
be conceptually unified, contract law would be comprised of a
hodgepodge of case types that applied unsystematically, unpredictably, and incoherently to particular cases. In contrast, Fried’s
effort to prove the coherence of contract law is not motivated by a
61

Charles Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation 1 (1981).
Id. at 2.
63
Id. at 6.
62
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concern to explain how contract law provides the basis of decisions,
let alone determines results, in contracts cases. For Fried, the primary challenge of demonstrating the adjudicative legitimacy of
contract law is proving that contract law itself is justified by a compelling moral principle. So for him, the attacks on the conceptual
unity of contract law undermined the prospect that contract law
could be justified by subsuming it under a single moral principle.
Fried’s strategy is to prove the adjudicative legitimacy of contract law by demonstrating that a single moral principle both renders contract law’s otherwise distinct doctrines coherent and provides its deep moral justification. He argues that contract law is
justified because it enforces the moral obligations of promisors,
and the correlative moral rights of promisees, that arise out of the
act of promising. By making a promise, an individual invokes the
social convention of promising, which invites the promisee to trust
the promisor. Trust, in turn, enables individuals to give effect to
their will, to pursue their lives autonomously by cooperating with
others. The institution of promising enables individuals to invoke
morality to pursue their own conceptions of the good freely and effectively. As such, promising is vital to the liberal conception of the
self and society. By making a promise, a promisor incurs the moral
obligation to keep the trust he willfully invited. By breaking his
promise, the promisor abuses this trust.64 Contract law serves to
prevent or remedy such morally impermissible abuses of trust.65
Thus, Fried’s central claim is that contract law is justified because it
enforces the moral obligation to keep promises, which in turn is
central to liberal individualism.
In the development of contract theory, Fried’s theory is most
important for both its emphasis on defending the distinctiveness

64

See id. at 8, 16.
In Fried’s words,
[T]rust becomes a powerful tool for our working our mutual wills in the
world. . . . The device that gives trust its sharpest, most palpable form is promise. By promising we put in another man’s hands a new power to accomplish his
will, though only a moral power: What he sought to do alone he may now expect to do with our promised help, and to give him this new facility was our very
purpose in promising. By promising we transform a choice that was morally
neutral into one that is morally compelled. Morality . . . is itself invoked,
molded to allow us better to work that particular will.
Id. at 8.
65
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and coherence of contract law and the implicit theory of precedential authority on which Fried relies in mounting that defense.66 We
have seen that Williston implicitly subscribed to the view that precedential authority resides in case outcomes, rather than express
judicial reasoning. Fried implicitly subscribes to the opposite view.
Indeed, the doctrinal inspiration for his theory of contract as promise is Section 1 of the second Restatement, which states that “[a]
contract is a promise . . . for the breach of which the law gives a
remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes a duty.” Rather than relying directly on express judicial reasoning, Fried typically treats Williston’s treatise itself, along with
both Restatements, as sources of contract doctrine equally as authoritative as the cases themselves. The best example is Fried’s
analysis of the consideration doctrine. Fried considers the doctrine
because it is widely regarded to be an essential component of contract law. The bargain theory of consideration is the cornerstone of
the formalists’ unified conception of contract law, and yet it appears to be a clear counterexample to Fried’s thesis that contract
doctrine can be explained and justified by the moral promise principle.67 If Fried’s thesis is correct, then contract law should enforce
all morally binding promises. But the consideration doctrine is
used to prevent the legal enforcement of a large class of promises
that are morally binding.
Fried’s analysis of the consideration doctrine begins by identifying the doctrine with its formulations in the first and second Restatements, and Williston’s and Arthur Corbin’s descriptions of it
66
Because they are not germane to the present discussion, I do not discuss two fundamental criticisms of Fried’s theory that have featured prominently in contract theory scholarship. The first critique is that Fried’s theory presupposes without argument
that the law should enforce the moral obligation to keep promises. Given the welldeveloped arguments against legal moralism, defense of Fried’s theory requires either
a defense of legal moralism or an argument for why the legal enforcement of morality
is justified in the case of promises. The second is that his theory is unfalsifiable because it defines contract law as those doctrines that can be explained by the promise
principle, rather than claiming that the promise principle can explain most doctrines
that are widely regarded, pretheoretically, to be core contract doctrines. See Kraus,
supra note 15, at 703–15.
67
Although Fried can dismiss most cases not explicable in terms of the moral promise principle by relegating them to other areas of the law (such as tort law), there is no
plausible alternative doctrinal home for the consideration cases. Even for Fried, the
consideration doctrine, if internally coherent, is a counterexample to his theory.
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in their treatises. Although these descriptions sometimes quote directly from cases, more often they represent the authors’ views of
the rules and principles implicitly, if not explicitly, underlying the
cases. Accordingly, Fried identifies the consideration doctrine with
two propositions culled from Williston’s treatise and the Restatements:
(A) The consideration that in law promotes a mere promise into
a contractual obligation is something, or the promise of something, given in exchange for the promise. (B) The law is not at all
interested in the adequacy of the consideration. The goodness of
the exchange is for the parties alone to judge—the law is con68
cerned only that there be an exchange.

Fried then goes on to consider ten classic consideration cases
and concludes that propositions (A) and (B) cannot explain their
outcomes. The reason, Fried argues, is that (A) affirms exchange
while (B) affirms freedom of contract, yet “[t]hese two ideas turn
out to be contradictory.”69 In short, (A)’s requirement that something be given in exchange for a promise is, in principle, eviscerated by (B)’s prohibition against judicial inquiry into the adequacy
of the thing given in exchange for a promise. Fried’s analysis of the
ten cases is, therefore, purely illustrative. His proof of the internal
incoherence of the consideration doctrine follows from his analysis
of (A) and (B) alone. And it is on this ground that Fried rejects the
consideration doctrine as inexplicable and unjustifiable, thereby
removing an otherwise serious obstacle to his argument that contract doctrine can be explained and justified by the promise principle. In Fried’s words, the bargain theory of consideration and its
doctrinal extensions70 are “obviously gibberish.”71 The consideration doctrine is no counterexample to Fried’s thesis because it is incoherent and therefore cannot be explained or justified by any
theory of contract law. Since it is incoherent, it should be rejected
as bad law or no law at all.
68

Fried, supra note 56, at 29.
Id.
70
These second Restatement sections state rules for enforcing promises made for
benefits received (the material benefit rule, § 86), modifying agreements (§ 89), and
reviving otherwise unenforceable debts (§§ 82 and 83).
71
Fried, supra note 56, at 32.
69
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Evidently, it did not occur to Fried that statements of doctrine in
Williston’s treatise and the Restatements were themselves not always the result of an effort to summarize the express judicial reasoning in the dominant case law, but instead represented a deliberate effort to articulate a principle or rule that best accounted for
the case outcomes, whether or not it coincided with the express
reasoning in the most important or majority of cases. When Fried
concludes that a contract doctrine, as stated in Williston’s treatise
or the Restatements, cannot render the case outcomes coherent, he
dismisses the doctrine itself, rather than the particular statement of
it, as incoherent. Here Fried’s implicit assumption is either that
Williston and the authors of the Restatements accurately described
the express judicial reasoning in the cases allegedly supporting the
doctrine Williston states, or that Williston’s or the Restatements’
version of the doctrine, whether or not an initially accurate account
of express judicial reasoning, has been expressly accepted in judicial decisions since, in effect transforming it into express judicial
reasoning. Either way, the irony is that Williston himself would not
regard a demonstration that his own statements of contract doctrine failed to explain the case outcomes, or were internally incoherent, as grounds for concluding that there is no coherent doctrine
that adheres in the case outcomes. Rather, just as a scientist confronted with disconfirming but accurate data would reject his theory, and not the recalcitrant data, Williston would have rejected his
own account of the doctrine and attempted to identify a more satisfactory theory of the doctrine that better accommodated the case
outcomes in question. That Fried does not follow suit indicates that
he treats the precedential authority of cases as residing in the (secondary sources he takes to be proxies of) express judicial reasoning
in the cases rather than the principle or rule that best explains the
case outcomes, whether or not the judges who decided the cases
expressly identified the same or a different principle or rule as the
ground for their decisions.
B. Fried’s Affinity to the Express Reasoning View of Precedential
Authority
Just as the formalists’ theory of the adjudicative legitimacy helps
explain their view that precedential authority resides in case outcomes, Fried’s theory of adjudicative legitimacy helps explain his

KRAUS_BOOK

2008]

2/20/2008 8:06 PM

From Langdell to Law and Economics

187

implicit embrace of the view that precedential authority resides in
express judicial reasoning (or what he regarded as authoritative
summaries thereof). By treating express judicial reasoning as mere
theories of doctrines, and not the doctrines themselves, the formalists maximized the likelihood that a small set of unifying principles,
and derivative rules, would be able to account for the large body of
cases applying contract law. In contrast, the common premise in all
of Fried’s doctrinal arguments is that precedential authority resides
in express or implied judicial reasoning rather than case outcomes
alone. This view of precedential authority allows Fried to raise the
bar against competing explanations and justifications of contract
law. By treating judicial reasoning as the doctrine itself, rather than
a fallible theory of the doctrine, his view of precedential authority
eliminates competing theories that can account for case outcomes
only by rejecting the actual judicial reasoning used in contracts
cases. Moreover, it allows Fried to take full advantage of the normative language and structure of contract cases to vindicate his
claim that the moral promise principle justifies contract law. Indeed, if we take the express statements of cases (or their summaries in treatises and restatements) to constitute contract doctrine,
the idea of Contract as Promise could hardly be more intuitive: The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts defines contract in terms of
promise.72 Finally, unlike the formalists, Fried is not concerned that
identifying doctrine with express judicial reasoning will constrain
his theory’s ability to provide a unified account of case outcomes
with different or inconsistent express judicial reasoning. Fried’s objective is not to subsume as many cases as possible, or even a pretheoretically identified core of cases, under the promise principle.
Instead, his goal is to establish that the core of contract law can and
should be defined only by those doctrines grounded in the moral
promise principle. Fried accomplishes this simply by stipulating
that the cases invoking express judicial reasoning based on the
moral promise principle constitute the core of contract law. All
other cases, on Fried’s view, simply fall outside the province of
contract law.73

72
73

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 1 (1981).
See supra text accompanying note 62.
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Although Fried’s view of precedential authority is ideally suited
to his defense of this claim, he never acknowledges that a full theory of adjudicative legitimacy not only requires a theory of the justification of contract law but also an account of how contract law
provides the basis for deciding outcomes in contract cases. Indeed,
one of the central criticisms of deontic theories of contract in general, and Fried’s theory in particular, is that the deontic concepts
that, in their view, comprise contract doctrine lack the capacity to
provide the basis for deciding which party should prevail in contracts cases.74 While serious theories of judicial decisionmaking differ in their accounts of how law provides the basis for deciding
cases, and certainly have divergent answers to the question of
whether law can or should determine case outcomes, deontic theories such as Fried’s typically ignore the burden of addressing this
essential component in a theory of adjudicative legitimacy.
III. THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CONTRACT LAW
Gilmore’s assault on formalist contract theory, together with the
CLS critique of law, implied that any attempt to provide a unified
theoretical account of contract law was bound to fail. Fried’s theory of contract as promise defended the claim that contract law
could be unified under a single theoretical account. In that sense,
Fried’s theory shared the formalists’ aspiration to demonstrate the
internal coherence of contract law. But his theory’s studied indifference to explaining case outcomes flaunted the central concern
that motivated the formalists to provide a unified account of contract: to prove that contract case outcomes were determined by the
largely mechanical application of legal rules, rather than the operation of judicial discretion.
Developing alongside Gilmore’s critique and Fried’s response
was the nascent field of law and economics. The first generation of
scholars offering an economic analysis of contract law seemed to
conceive of their enterprise much as the formalists conceived of
theirs. Both the classical theorists and economic analysts subscribed to the precedents-as-outcomes view because it maximized
their ability to reconcile case law with their conception of contract
74

See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of
Promising, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 489 (1989).
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law, which often was unsupported by the express judicial reasoning
in contracts precedents. But the classical conception of contract
law was premised on the view that only a formal system of contract
law could produce determinate case outcomes. The economic conception of contract law, however, was premised on the view that
economic reasoning was at least in principle capable of uniquely
determining case outcomes, while the express reasoning of contracts cases typically was not.
A representative example of early explanatory economic analysis is Charles Goetz and Robert Scott’s classic 1980 article, “Enforcing Promises,”75 which appears to embrace something like the
formalists’ conception of precedential authority. In that article,
Goetz and Scott conceive of their enterprise as an attempt to demystify the otherwise unhelpful doctrinal rhetoric of promissory
estoppel by providing an account that explains how actual case
outcomes are determined in adjudication. Consider their analysis
of Section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. That section states that “[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably
expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee
or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance
is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise.”76 Goetz and Scott presume that the term “reasonable”
offers no concrete guidance for how judges should or will decide
cases under Section 90 and offer their theory as an explanation of
the meaning of the key substantive language in Section 90:
In order to discourage the promisee from overrelying, the promisor must not be held liable for damages when the promisee knew
or should have known that the marginal cost of self-protection
was lower than the corresponding marginal reduction in prospective regret costs. This rule gives meaning to the concept of “rea77
sonable reliance.”

Goetz and Scott clearly regard the purely doctrinal accounts of
when promissory liability will be imposed as unilluminating because they fail to explain the pattern of outcomes in cases. For ex75

Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the
Basis of Contract, 89 Yale L.J. 1261 (1980).
76
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (1981).
77
Goetz & Scott, supra note 75, at 1280 (emphasis added).
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ample, they write that the pattern of enforcement under the bargain theory
typically has been explained in terms of differences in the magnitude of either actual or likely reliance. Neither explanation is
persuasive. . . . The enforcement pattern could be explained if,
during entry into, and exit from, bargaining, reassurance were
cheaper than precaution. Then, the risk of a regret contingency
could be allocated more cheaply by adjusting reliance once the
78
promise is made rather than restricting the promise itself.

They then conclude that “the design of the consideration model
can be explained persuasively by an analysis of efficient risk allocation.”79
Like the formalists, Goetz and Scott take legal doctrine to consist in the best explanation of the pattern of outcomes in contract
cases rather than the rhetoric of the judicial reasoning in contracts
cases. Again, in discussing promissory estoppel, Goetz and Scott
write that “[a]lthough the rhetoric of some [promissory estoppel
cases] suggests that reimbursement damages are the preferred recovery under promissory estoppel, the outcomes imply that courts
are animated by the same [economic] concerns that have produced
the design of the consideration model.”80 After presenting their
economic analysis of the optimal promissory enforcement regime,
Goetz and Scott conclude that “a substantial congruence exists between traditional contract rules and optimal promissory enforcement. Indeed, this congruence offers a persuasive explanation for
the peculiar patterns of promissory liability observed in actual practice.”81 Finally, in their conclusion, Goetz and Scott claim that
“[e]conomic concepts are useful . . . in specifying the effects of legal
objectives and in observing and isolating systemic patterns of enforcement. . . . [S]ystematic collection and observation of data increases understanding of the regulation of behavior by legal
rules.”82 For Goetz and Scott, then, the task of explanatory eco-

78

Id. at 1294–95.
Id. at 1296.
80
Id. at 1315 (emphasis added).
81
Id. at 1265 (emphasis added).
82
Id. at 1321.
79
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nomic analysis is to explain how outcomes are determined in contracts cases.
Of course, since Goetz and Scott do not reflect on the jurisprudential foundations of their project, we can only speculate that
their conception of legal explanation derived from the same kinds
of considerations that I have argued motivated the formalists.
That speculation finds support in one of the few explicit reflections to be found in the early law-and-economics literature. Richard Posner, the chief exponent of the positive economic analysis
of law, published the first treatise on law and economics in 1972.83
In the third edition of his treatise, published in 1986, Posner describes what he takes to be the motivating aspirations of positive
economic analysis of law. Just as Fried seeks to demonstrate the
unity of contract law using a deontic principle, Posner begins by
affirming the aspiration to demonstrate the underlying coherence,
or unity, of the law using an economic principle: “The law is a system; it has a unity that economic analysis can illuminate.”84 But
the similarity between Fried’s and Posner’s conceptions of legal
theory ends there. Posner goes on to explain that economic analysis seeks to explain the “legal rules and outcomes” of the common
law.85 More specifically, he argues that the “true grounds” of decisions often are not reflected in judicial rhetoric: “It is an advantage of economic analysis rather than a drawback that it does not
analyze cases in the conceptual modes employed in the opinions
themselves.”86 Moreover, Posner claims that the “economic theory
of law is the most promising positive theory of law extant.
While . . . other social scientists besides economists also make
positive analyses of the legal system, their work is thus far insufficiently rich in theoretical or empirical content to afford serious
competition to the economists.”87
Posner’s remarks suggest an affinity between his conception of
explanatory economic analysis and the formalists’ conception of

83

The Death of Contract was published in 1974 and Contract as Promise was published in 1981.
84
Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, at xx (3d ed. 1986).
85
Id. at 21.
86
Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 6 (1st ed. 1972).
87
See Posner, supra note 84, at 24.
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law as a legal science.88 In particular, both aspire to demonstrate
the scientific respectability of areas of law by demonstrating how
the legal rules determine outcomes in cases. Posner’s economic
analyses of substantive areas of law, especially the common law areas such as contracts and torts, consist in direct application of economic principles to the outcomes of cases, not the doctrinal statements of the judges who decided the cases. Posner’s analysis of
Bentley v. State89 is typical.90 In that case, Bentley was hired by the
state of Wisconsin to build new wings for the state capital building
according to architectural plans supplied by the state’s architect.
When the wings collapsed due to poor design, the state sued Bentley. The court held for Bentley. Without even citing the judicial
reasoning of the case, Posner explains it by demonstrating why the
state was the cheapest insurer of the risk that the architectural
plans were defective: “[I]t is unlikely that Bentley was a better insurer than the state. Bentley would probably have to go out and
buy an insurance policy; the state could self-insure against the particular risk.”91 As his analysis of Bentley makes clear, Posner takes
the explanatory success of economic analysis to consist in its ability
to correctly determine case outcomes. Like the late nineteenthcentury contract formalists before him, Posner’s explanatory economic theory prescinds from the details of doctrinal rhetoric and
claims to have unearthed a basic principle of economics that un-

88

Thomas Grey also observes that the law-and-economics movement generally, and
Richard Posner’s work in particular, has a Langdellian foundation:
A movement in legal theory that has closer links to the Benthamite dream of
policy science is the school of law and economics. But, on closer inspection, that
school turns out to be neo-orthodox too. Its leader, Richard Posner, says that
economic analysis cannot supplant, but only predict and criticize, a course of legal decision carried on case-by-case according to orthodox methods. And Posner finds “efficiency,” with all the connotation of approval that term carries in
his theory, in the content as well as the methods of Langdellian private law.
Grey, supra note 17, at 51.
89
41 N.W. 338 (Wis. 1889).
90
Another example is Posner’s discussion of causation in torts cases: “The results in
these cases seem to owe little to refined notions of causation, and much to considerations of (economic) policy, yet they are conventionally discussed by lawyers under the
rubric of cause in fact.” Posner, supra note 84, at 169.
91
Id. at 83.
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derwrites the application of legal doctrines to individual cases.92
Unlike his formalist predecessors, Posner made several initial attempts to establish the credentials of economic analysis under the
second prong of adjudicative legitimacy as well. Unfortunately, his
efforts to explain how legal rules and principles based on various
notions of efficiency could justify the exercise of political coercion
were entirely unsuccessful.93
CONCLUSION
Gilmore’s The Death of Contract is a landmark of twentiethcentury contracts scholarship. It was the first major occasion for reflection on the legal credentials, and therefore the credentialing
process, of modern American contract law. If we take Gilmore at
his word, the lesson of his book is that the core legal principles of
American contract law were virtually a complete fabrication, imagined by a few elite members of the nineteenth-century bar and legal academy and transformed into actual law through brazen and
bald-faced lies backed by the sheer force of their influential personalities. It is always dangerous to take Grant Gilmore at his
92

Describing the seminal status of Ronald Coase’s famous article “The Problem of
Social Costs,” 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960), in the history of the economic analysis in law,
Posner claims that:
An important although for a time neglected feature of Coase’s article was its
implications for the positive economic analysis of legal doctrine. Coase suggested that the English law of nuisance had an implicit economic logic. Later
writers have generalized this insight and argued that many of the doctrines and
institutions of the legal system are best understood and explained as efforts to
promote the efficient allocation of resources . . . .
Posner, supra note 84, at 20. Posner then claims that:
Although few judicial opinions contain explicit references to economic concepts, often the true grounds of legal decision are concealed rather than illuminated by the characteristic rhetoric of opinions. Indeed, legal education consists
primarily of learning to dig beneath the rhetorical surface to find those grounds,
many of which may turn out to have an economic character. . . . It would not be
surprising to find that legal doctrines rest on inarticulate gropings toward efficiency, especially when we bear in mind that many of those doctrines date back
to the late eighteenth and the nineteenth century, when a laissez faire ideology
based on classical economics was the dominant ideology of the educated classes
in society.
Id. at 21.
93
For a brief review of Posner’s early attempts to defend the principle of wealth
maximization, see Jody S. Kraus, Reconciling Autonomy and Efficiency in Contract
Law: The Vertical Integration Strategy, 11 Phil. Issues 420, 428–31 (2001).
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word. If we give Gilmore the charitable interpretation he refused
to give to the classical theorists, the real lesson is that appearances
can be deceiving, as much in law as in life. While Gilmore showed
how the classical theorists’ conception of contract law might appear
to be inconsistent with the precedent they cited on its behalf,
whether it constitutes a reasonable use of precedent turns, unsurprisingly, on one’s view of how precedents should be interpreted.
I have argued that the true disagreement between Gilmore and
the classical theorists is over the question of whether the precedential authority of cases resides in their express judicial reasoning or
in the doctrine that best explains their outcomes.94 Once that dispute is settled, the matter of determining the content of late nineteenth-century (or any period of) American contract law is comparatively straightforward. I have also argued that the fundamental
stakes in the debate over the nature of precedential authority lie in
the theory of adjudicative legitimacy. The precedents-as-expressreasoning view typically fares well in explaining how a theory of
contract law can satisfy the first prong of adjudicative legitimacy:
94

The deontic critique of the economic analysis of the common law sets out what is
perhaps the best known objection to the view that the precedential authority of cases
consists in the best theory of their outcomes and not in their express or implied judicial reasoning. In Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law
Adjudication: A Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 Va. L.
Rev. 287 (2007), I consider the claim advanced by deontic theorists that the economic
analysis is disqualified as an explanation of the common law because it lacks an adequate account of express judicial reasoning in common law cases. That critique argues
that any explanation of the common law must explain or adequately explain away the
fact that common law judges use express reasoning that is often couched in deontic
terms which are inconsistent with the exclusively consequentialist reasoning of the
economic analysis. I argue that the economic analysis has a plausible account for this
divergence based on semantic evolution and therefore does not presuppose that
judges either conspire to mislead others or delude themselves. The deontic critique of
the economic analysis of the common law sets out what is perhaps the best known objection to the view that the precedential authority of cases consists in the best theory
of their outcomes and not in their express or implied judicial reasoning. Apart from
this debate, many additional obstacles confront the precedents-as-outcomes view. For
example, John Rawls’s highly influential theory, Political Liberalism, holds that the
justification of political coercion must be provided using public reason, which in turn
requires that judicial reasoning be publicly accessible. If express judicial reasoning
provides either no guide or an opaque guide to the legal reasoning on which the case
was actually decided and the precedential authority for which the case stands, then
arguably Rawls’s public justification requirement is not met in most common law decisions. I discuss this point in Jody S. Kraus, Legal Determinacy and Moral Justification, 48 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1773, 1785 (2007).
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the requirement that contract law be capable of justifying the exercise of political coercion implicitly threatened as enforcement for
any judicial judgment. The precedents-as-outcomes view typically
fares better in explaining how a theory of contract law can satisfy
the second prong of adjudicative legitimacy: the requirement that
contract law be capable of explaining how the outcome of the case
resulted from the legal rules and principles that are supposed to
explain it.
Gilmore’s true legacy is his call on contract theorists to reflect on
the nature of their enterprise. That reflection reveals that just as
the classical theorists and Gilmore were talking past each other,
because they subscribed to incompatible views of the nature of
precedential authority, so too contemporary deontic contract theorists such as Charles Fried, and contemporary explanatory economic analysts of contract law such as Charles Goetz, Robert
Scott, and Richard Posner, are talking past each other for the same
reason. History repeats itself, especially if we fail to notice and
heed its lessons. Contract theory, like any theory of law, ultimately
rests on basic jurisprudential views about the nature of law, legal
authority, and political legitimacy. By exposing these jurisprudential foundations, contract theorists can move beyond the current
impasse that impedes productive discussions between competing
types of contract theory. My hope is that contract theorists might
then settle on common philosophical denominators to underwrite a
joint theoretical enterprise to understand and evaluate contract
law. More modestly, I hope adherents of each competing school of
contract theory at least no longer suppose that they can engage in
meaningful dialogue with each other without first clarifying the
philosophical assumptions at the foundation of their separate enterprises.

